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1 Introduction
Consider a roommate problem such that two students prefer to share a room
rather than sticking to their current roommates. On their own, these students can
only do so if there is a room available to them. Indeed, when an assignement gives a
student the right to occupy a given room, and all rooms are occupied by others, these
students cannot, on their own, enforce a new matching in which they occupy a room
together. More generally, the size of the set of available rooms (matching locations)
can eﬀectively restrict the possible matchings that a set of agents can enforce over
the current assignment. When this is the case, it is natural to consider the set of
available matching locations as a primitive of the matching problem, alongside the
agents and their preferences. A stability concept that is defined on such a matching
problem should then take these primitives as given.
The first contribution of this paper is to formally introduce a, possibly scarce, set
of matching locations into one-to-one matching problems. Doing so, we generalize
one-to-one matching problems by possibly requiring that a match between agents
must happen at a matching location. We introduce a finite set of matching locations
and the notion of a location mapping as a function that assigns agents to a matching
location, if any, providing them with the right to be matched at that location. We
then require that a match between two agents happens if and only if both are
assigned to the same location by a location mapping.
The second contribution of our paper is to study stability in this setting by an-
alyzing the incentives of (a group of) agents to change the current ’status quo’
matching. In order to do so, we first analyze how a set of agents can alter the
composition of any given matching. This is operationalized through the idea of
enforceability. We introduce two diﬀerent concepts of enforceability. First, we say
that a set of agents can directly enforce one matching over an initial assignment
if they can reassigning the matching locations amongst them that are exclusively
under their control. Second, we say that a set of agents can exchange* enforce
one matching over an initial assignment if they can reassign themselves the rights
that are exclusively under their control. The key diﬀerence between the two enforce-
ability conditions is that direct enforceability requires that the agents must control
all rights assigned to a location, while exchange* enforceability only requires that
they exchange location rights, thereby potentially ’forcing’ other agents to accept
a diﬀerent partner of the (deviating) set. In other words, exchange* enforceability
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implies that if a partner x of an agent y exchanges her matching right with someone
else, say agent z , then agent y has no say in this exchange, even if it means she
will become matched to agent z . We also allow agents to exchange their current
location right for any available (unassigned) locations right as it seems natural to
let agents, when they are allowed to exchange matching location rights, to perform
this swap. From this it logically follows that direct enforceability implies exchange*
enforceability but not vice versa: exchange* enforceability allows for more possible
alterations of a given matching by some set of agents than direct enforceability.
The enforceability notions are then used to define dominance relationships, direct
dominance and exchange* dominance, and stability concepts, direct stability
and coalition-exchange* stability. A matching is directly (coalition-exchange*)
stable if it is not directly (exchange*) dominated by any other matching. A match-
ing is exchange* stable if it is not exchange* dominated by a pair or singleton of
agents. Direct stability is closely related to Gale Shapley stability. Gale Shap-
ley stability is an ex ante stability1 concept in the sense that before a matching is
implemented , no single or pair of agents (a blocking pair or individual) would like
to deviate. Once a matching is implemented (ex-post), two agents may want to
deviate but cannot if they cannot find a matching location to do so. Gale Shapley
stability is thus equivalent to direct stability when assuming that the set of match-
ing locations is never scarce. Exchange* stability is diﬀerent from the notion of
exchange stability introduced by Alcalde (1995). He defines a matching to be
exchange stable if there does not exist an exchange blocking pair : no two agents
can be made better oﬀ by exchanging their current matching position. The implicit
assumption behind this concept is that there are no unassigned matching locations
(rights) which a set of agents can exchange their current matching rights for. In
other words, the set of matching locations must be limited. Our paper is rooted in
the same spirit as Morrill (2010) who studies the roommate problem and asks: ’ex
post, what types of coalitions will be able to block a given assignment?’, recognizing
that agents face two restrictions: 1. the set of rooms is limited (the amount of rooms
is exactly half the amount of students) and 2. bilateral approval is needed to dis-
solve a match between two roommates. Morrill’s (2010) set up then naturally leads
to finding Pareto optimal matchings. Morrill (2010) notes that when the current
assignment can be dissolved unilaterally, then (Gale Shapley) stability is a natural
stability concept. Our paper argues that direct (exchange*) stability is a natural
solution concept when rights cannot (can) be exchanged. Our first result (propo-
sition 1) is that coalition-exchange* stability is a refinement of direct stability. At
1This meaning of ex ante stability is to be distinguished from Kesten and Unver (2015).
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first hand, this seems to be at odds with the literature in view of Alcalde’s result
(1995) that Gale Shapley stability and exchange stability are mutually independent
stability concepts. We show that this is due to the fact that these stability concepts
(implicitly) assume diﬀerent location restrictions: scarcity in the case of exchange
stability and no scarcity in the case of Gale Shapley stability. When one considers
the set of matching locations and associated matching rights as a primitive of the
matching problem then this independence result disappears. We subsequently show
(proposition 2) that when matching locations are not scarce then direct stability is
equivalent to Gale Shapley stability and coalition-exchange* stability is equivalent
to requiring Gale Shapley stability and exchange stability simultaneously.
The third contribution of the paper is to provide an interesting link between
exchange* dominance and indirect dominance, a concept introduced by Harsanyi
(1971) and later formalized by Chwe (1994) in order to study deviations from a
current ’state’ when agents do not care about the immediate consequences of their
actions but rather care about the final outcome after other agents have reacted to
their initial reaction. The farsighted core of a matching problem is the set of all
matchings that are not indirectly dominated by some matching. In Theorem 1 we
show that whenever a matching exchange* dominates some other matching and all
agents who see their match change find their new partner acceptable, then it also
indirectly dominates this matching. Intuitively, if two agents wish to exchange their
partners but would need the consent of the latter to do so, then they could perform
this swap in two steps: in step 1 they leave their current partner and in step 2 they
propose to match to complete the swap. On this path of indirect dominance, all
agents will always agree to the proposed changes given the status quo matching.
But, if agents are allowed to swap their current partners, these two steps can be
done in one. Such indirect dominance path can not exist if the agents who were
forced into a new partnership would rather be single than matched to their new
partner in a swap they did not initiate. In Corollary 1 we show that the set of
coalition-exchange* stable matchings of individually rational matching problems is
a superset of the farsighted core and equivalent to the farsighted core if there is not
location scarcity. It is well known that in this setting the farsighted core, and hence
the set of (coalition) exchange* stable matchings, is often empty and if it exists, it
must be a singleton. For this reason the literature (not assuming any restrictions on
the set of matching locations) has introduced alternative stability concepts to study
farsightedly stable matchings. A popular stability concept is the farsighted stable
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set (FSS)2. A set of matchings is a FSS if every matching outside the set is indirectly
dominated by some member of the set (external stability) and if the matchings of
the set do not indirectly dominate each other. Equivalently we define an exchange*
stable set (ESS) as a set of matchings that do not exchange* dominate each other
and all outside matchings are exchange* dominated by some matching in the set.
We then find (proposition 3) that an exchange stable set can never be a proper
subset of a farsighted stable set and sometimes is a superset of a farsighted stable
set. In addition we provide an example of a matching problem without a FSS but
for which there exists an ESS.
The computer science literature paid ample attention to the computational com-
plexity question of determining whether a given matching problem admits a Gale
Shapley stable3 or exchange stable matching. It is known (Manlove 2013 and Irving
2008) that deciding whether a (one-to-one) matching is both exchange stable (a` la
Alcalde 1995) and Gale Shapley stable is NP complete. The last contribution of
this paper exploits the link between exchange* dominance and indirect dominance
to say something about the complexity of finding farsightedly stable matchings in
one-to-one matching problems when the set of location rights is not scarce, that is
when coalition-exchange* stability is equivalent to exchange stability combined with
Gale Shapley stability: while deciding whether a matching is Gale Shapley stable
is solvable in polynomial time, deciding whether a one-to-one matching problem
admits a unique farsighted matching (the farsighted core) is NP-complete (corollary
2).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces one-to-one
matching problems with location restrictions. Section 3 introduces direct stabil-
ity and (coalition)-exchange* stability and discusses the relationship between these
concepts. Section 4 analyzes the relationship between exchange* dominance and
indirect dominance. Section 5 deals with the computation complexity question of
deciding whether a given matching problem admits a farsighted stable matching.
Section 6 concludes.
2See Ray and Vohra (2014) for a recent discussion of this concept.
3Determining whether a given roommate problem with strict preferences admits a stable assignment is solvable
in polynomial time (see for instance Irving, 1985 and Ronn, 1990, for a discussion).
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2 One-to-one matching problems with location re-
strictions
2.1 The primitives
A one-to-one matching problem, or roommate problem, is a triple (L,N, P ). L
is a finite set of locations, where a specific location is denoted by l where l ∈ L, N
is a finite set of agents and P is a preference profile specifying for each agent i ∈ N
a strict preference ordering over N . That is, P = {P (1), ..., P (i), ..., P (n)}, where
P (i) is agent i’s strict preference ordering over the agents in N including herself.
For instance, P (i) = 4, 5, i, 2, ... indicates that agent i prefers agent 4 to agent 5 and
she prefers to remain alone rather than get matched to anyone else. We denote by
L and N the cardinality of L and N respectively. We denote by R the weak orders
associated with P . We write j ￿i k if agent i strictly prefers j to k, j ∼i k if i is
indiﬀerent between j and k, and j ￿i k if j ￿i k or j ∼i k. The primitives of any
one-to-one matching problem are thus L,N and P. Amarriage problem with location
restrictions is a roommate problem (L,N, P ) where N is the union of two disjoint
finite sets: a set of men M = {m1, . . . ,mh}, and a set of women, W = {w1, . . . , wf},
where possibly h ￿= f , and P is a preference profile specifying for each man m ∈M
a strict preference ordering over W ∪ {m} and for each woman w ∈ W a strict
preference ordering over M ∪ {w}: P = {P (m1), . . . , P (mh), P (w1), . . . , P (wf )}.
That is, each man (woman) prefers being unmatched to be matched with any other
agent in M (W , respectively). Since the a marriage problem is a special kind of
roommate problem we will, throughout the paper, use the more general set up
and notation of the roommate problem, while sometimes specifically referring to
the marriage problem whenever appropriate. A roommate problem is individually
rational if all agents prefer to be matched rather than remain single: ∀i, j ∈ N :
j ￿i i.
2.2 Matching with location restrictions
We now formally introduce the idea that a match between two diﬀerent agents
must happen at a matching ’location’. Define the mapping λ : N → L∪∅ to be
a function that assigns a location to each player allowing for the possibility that
agents are not assigned to any location l ∈ L:
Definition 1. λ : N → L ∪ ∅ is a location mapping when λ(i) = λ(j) = l ∈ L and
i ￿= j ⇒ λ(k) ￿= l for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}
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The mapping λ assigns a location to at most two agents and allows for agents
not to be assigned to any location: λ(i) = ∅. Define λ−1 : L → N ∪ ∅ as the
correspondence that assigns to each location l the set of agents that are located at
this location. If no agent is located at l ∈ L, then λ−1(l) = ∅. Let λ ∈ Λ where
Λ is the set of all possible location mappings. The concept of a location mapping
naturally leads to the definition of a matching under location restrictions.
Definition 2. Given is λ ∈ Λ. A matching is a function µλ : N → N satisfying the
following properties:
1. ∀i ∈ N , µλ(µλ(i)) = i;
2. ∀ i ￿= j : µλ(i) = j ⇔ λ(i) = λ(j) = l ∈ L.
Condition 1 implies that a matching must yield a partition of the set N into
pairs and/or singletons. Condition 2 imposes that for two diﬀerent agents to be
matched they must be assigned the same location l ∈ L. Denote by M* the set of
all matchings. One interpretation of a matching problem with location restrictions
is that in order for two agents to be matched at location l, they must both possess
(be assigned) the matching right attached to matching location l, where l belongs
to a limited set of possible matching locations. In other words, if an agent ’owns’ a
matching right to a certain matching location then no other agent can assign herself
this matching right unless the ’owner’ agrees to this.4
We assume that agents have no preference over the possible matching locations
but only over their possible partners at such a location.5 Agent µλ(i) is agent i’s
partner at µλ; i.e., the agent with whom she is matched to (possibly herself). A
matching µλ is individually rational if each agent is acceptable to his or her
partner, i.e. µλ(i) ￿i i for all i ∈ N . For a given matching µλ, a pair {i, j} (possibly
i = j) is said to form a direct blocking pair if they are not matched to one another
but prefer one another to their partner at µλ and they can assign themselves to some
location l ∈ L to which no one else is assigned by the current location mapping λ, i.e.
j ￿i µλ(i), i ￿j µλ(j) and ∃l ∈ L such that ∀k /∈ {i, j} : λ(k) ￿= l. This definition is
4This interpretation is in line with that of Alcalde (1995) but additionally introduces scarcity of matching
locations.
5We do so to focus on the consequences of introducing scarcity in the set of possible matching locations.
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diﬀerent from the classic definition of a blocking pair (Gale Shapley, 1962) since it
requires two agents who prefer to be matched together to their current match, to be
able to guarantee themselves a location to do so. We extend each agent’s preference
over her potential partners to the set of matchings in the following way. We say
that agent i prefers µ￿λ￿ to µλ, if and only if agent i prefers her partner at µ
￿
λ￿ to
her partner at µλ, µ￿λ￿(i) ￿i µλ(i). Abusing notation, we write this as µ￿λ￿ ￿i µλ. A
coalition S is a subset of N . In order to study stability in this setting one needs
to know how a given matching µλ can be altered by a coalition of agents S ⊂ N.
We will introduce two diﬀerent notions of enforceability: direct enforceability
and exchange* enforceability. A specific stability concept is then defined using
a given enforceability concept.
3 Enforceability, dominance and stability
3.1 Direct enforceability, dominance and stability
Define for any coalition S the set Lλ(S) as those locations that members of
coalition S can, on their own, control: no one outside of S is assigned to a location
in Lλ(S) :
Lλ(S) =
￿
l ∈ L,λ−1(l) ⊂ S ￿
Note in particular that this definition implies that all l ∈ L such that λ(l) = ∅
belong to Lλ(S): all unassigned locations can be controlled by the members of S
when contemplating a deviation from the current matching. We can now state the
definition of direct enforceability:
Definition 3. Given is a matching µλ ∈M*. A coalition S ⊆ N is said to be able
to directly enforce a matching µ￿λ￿ over µλ, denoted by µλ →S µ￿λ￿ , if the following
conditions hold for any agent i ∈ N :
1. µ￿λ￿(i) /∈ {µλ(i), i} implies {i, µ￿λ￿(i)} ⊆ S; and
2. µ￿λ￿(i) = i ￿= µλ(i) implies a) i ∈ S or b) i /∈ S and µλ(i) ∈ S such that
λ￿(µλ(i)) ∈ Lλ(S).
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Intuitively, this definition says that in order to ’deviate’ to a new matching a
set of agents S cannot reassign the locations of non-members without their permis-
sion. However, they can reassign the match of non-members by ’divorcing’ from a
non-member and taking up a diﬀerent location, possibly by becoming single. For in-
stance, if j = µλ(i) where i ∈ S and j /∈ S, then λ￿(i) ￿= λ(i) implies that µ￿λ￿(j) = ∅.
The definition simply means that if an agent obtains a new location right and by
doing so becomes matched to a new partner at this location, if any, then it must be
that both these agents agree to it and belong to S. In addition, such reallocation
must be feasible among members of S only. Note that the above definition is writ-
ten in terms of the matchings µλ and µ￿λ￿ . It is insightful to rewrite the definition of
direct enforceability in terms of the location assignment only.
Definition 4. Given is a matching µλ ∈M*. A coalition S ⊆ N is said to be able to
directly enforce a matching µ￿λ￿ over µλ, denoted by µλ →S µ￿λ￿ , if the following
conditions hold for any agent i ∈ N :
1. λ￿(i) ￿= λ(i)⇒ i ∈ S and λ￿(i) ∈ Lλ(S);
2. λ￿(i) = λ(i) and λ−1(λ(i)) ￿= λ￿−1(λ(i)) implies i ∈ S and λ(i) ∈ Lλ(S).
Condition 1 implies that when an agent obtains a new location assignment, then
this agent should belong to S and other members of S should be able to provide
this agent with this new location from the set Lλ(S): λ￿(i) ∈ Lλ(S). Condition 2
implies that when an agent accepts a new partner, while not having changed her own
location assignment, then this agent must belong to S and the members of S control
the other location right at that location or it is currently unassigned: λ(i) ∈ Lλ(S).
To illustrate how location scarcity aﬀects direct enforceability consider the following
example, adapted from Alcalde (1995):
Example 1. Let (L,N, P ) where L = {l1, l2} , N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and P (1) = 2, 3, 4;P (2) =
3, 1, 4;P (3) = 1, 2, 4 and P (4) = 1, 2, 3, illustrated as follows:
agent 1 agent 2 agent 3 agent 4
2 3 1 1
3 1 2 2
4 4 4 3
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Consider a matching µλ with the following the location assignment λ(1) = λ(3) =
l1 and λ(2) = λ(4) = l2 so that µλ = (13, 24). This means that agent 1 is matched
to agent 3 at location l1 and agent 2 is matched to agent 4 at location l2. Then the
set of agents S = {1, 4} can not directly enforce a matching over µλ in which they
are matched to one another. If the set of matching locations would be L = {l1, l2, l3}
then they would be able to enforce such a matching.
The concept of enforceability does not depend on the preferences of the agents.
Direct enforceability allows us to define the concepts of direct dominance and direct
stability:
Definition 5. Given is a matching problem (L,N, P ).
1. A matching µλ is directly dominated by µ￿λ￿ through coalition S, denoted
by µλ <S µ￿λ￿ , if there exists a coalition S ⊆ N of agents such that µ￿λ￿ ￿i µλ
∀i ∈ S and µλ →S µ￿λ￿ ;
2. A matching µλ is directly stable if no other matching µ￿λ￿ directly dominates
µλ.
Remark that if there exists a coalition S ⊂ N such that µλ <S µ￿λ￿ , then there also
exist a pair of agents {i, j} = S∗ ⊂ S, where possibly i = j, such that µλ <S∗ µ∗λ∗ .We
say that such a pair {i, j} is a direct blocking pair. Expressing direct dominance
in terms of coalitions or in terms of pairs is thus equivalent. A matching µλ is
directly blocked by a coalition S ⊆ N if there exists a matching µ￿λ￿ and a coalition
S such that µλ <S µ￿λ￿ . If S directly blocks µλ, then S is called a direct blocking
coalition for µ. The direct core of a roommate problem with location restrictions,
denoted by C(L,N, P ), consists of all matchings which are not directly blocked by
any coalition. It is equivalent to the set of directly stable matchings. Using the
notion of a direct blocking pair defined above we find that the definition of direct
stability is equivalent to the non-existence of any direct blocking pair or individual:
a matching µλ is directly stable if there does not exist a direct blocking pair {i, j}
where possibly i = j.
We now relate this concept to the classic stability concept introduced by Gale and
Shapley (1962). According to Gale and Shapley a matching is stable if there does not
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exist any blocking pair or individual in which a blocking pair is always allowed
to deviate by getting matched. As illustrated by example 1, it is immediate that the
concepts of direct stability and Gale Shapley stability are equivalent whenever L ≥
N−1. When this is the case then location restrictions are essentially immaterial and
direct stability yields equivalent predictions as Gale Shapley stability.Two agents
that would prefer to be linked could then always find a location that is currently
assigned to no one else. When L < N −1 agents have fewer opportunities to deviate
and the possibility arises that a matching is directly stable while it is not stable in
the Gale Shapley sense. The following example illustrates this:
Example 1 continued. Since there exists an odd cycle {1, 2, 3} this matching
problem is ’unsolvable’ in the Gale Shapley sense. The same conclusion is obtained
when L = {l1, ..., lk} where k > 2. However, when L = {l1, l2}, the following
matchings are directly stable: µλ = (13, 24), µ￿λ￿ = (14, 23), µ
∗
λ∗ = (12, 34). Impos-
ing more location restrictions leads to more matchings being directly stable. Con-
sider (L,N, P ) where L = {l1} , then all (constrained)6 Pareto optimal matchings
{(12), (13), (14), (23), (24), (34)} are directly stable.
3.2 Exchange* enforceability, dominance and stability
Define for any coalition S the set Lλ(S) as the locations that members of coalition
S partially control: any location in Lλ(S) belongs to some member of S or does not
belong to any agent according to location mapping λ :
Lλ(S) = {l ∈ L, ￿i, j /∈ S : λ(i) = λ(j) = l }
Lλ(S) is the set of locations that the set of agents S can ’use’ to form a new
matching through exchanging location rights, respecting the location rights of agents
who do not belong to S. Again, all locations that are not assigned under λ belong
to this set, but now also those locations that only belong to one agent who does not
belong to the set. We thus have that Lλ(S) ⊆ Lλ(S). Given Lλ(S) we can now state
the definition of exchange* enforceability:
Definition 6. Given is a matching µλ ∈M∗. A coalition S ⊆ N is said to be able to
exchange* enforce a matching µ￿λ￿ over µλ, denoted by µλ ￿S µ￿λ￿ , if the following
6Constrained in the sense that only one match can possibly be formed.
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conditions hold for any agent i ∈ N :
1. µ￿λ￿(i) /∈ {µλ(i), i} implies {i, µ￿λ￿(i)} ∩ S ￿= ∅ and λ￿(i) ∈ Lλ(S);
2. µ￿λ￿(i) = i ￿= µλ(i) implies i ∈ S if λ￿(i) ￿= λ(i).
Intuitively, this definition says that in order to enforce a new matching from the
current matching, a set of agents S can do so by reshuﬄing the available location
rights to members of S. The first condition implies that agents can create a new
matching by exchanging their location rights among themselves. This can happen
in two ways. First, an agent can obtain a new allocation right from another agent of
the set S through a permutation of location rights among members of S. Second, the
agent can obtain a location right that was not assigned to anyone under λ. The sec-
ond condition allows agents to exchange their current location assignment (and thus
their current partner) for a location that is not assigned to anyone else according to
λ or by simply giving up their current assignment without being assigned a location
according to λ￿. It is natural to assume that when agents are allowed to exchange
their locations, that then they should also be able to give up their current location
or to exchange their current location for an available unassigned location, as long
as no other agent of S assigns herself the same location. Similarly to the definition
of direct enforceability we can rewrite the definition of exchange* enforceability as
a function of the location mappings only.
Definition 7. Given is a matching µλ ∈ M. A coalition S ⊆ N is said to be able to
exchange* enforce a matching µ￿λ￿ over µλ, denoted by µλ ￿S µ￿λ￿ , if the following
condition holds for any agent i ∈ N : λ￿(i) ￿= λ(i)⇒ i ∈ S and λ￿(i) ∈ Lλ(S).
The key diﬀerence between direct and exchange* enforceability7 is that the latter
allows members of S to change the matching partner of agents who do not belong
to S without their consent. For instance, if j = µλ(i) where i ∈ S and j /∈ S, then
λ￿(i) ￿= λ(i) implies that µ￿λ￿(j) ∈ S \ {i} or µ￿λ￿(j) = ∅. The members of the set S
cannot reassign the locations of non-members, but they can reassign the partner of
non-members by exchanging their location right with some other agent or by simply
exchanging their location for a currently available location. It follows that direct
enforceability puts more restrictions on what a set of agents S can do in order to
7Note again that the notion of exchange* enforceability does not depend on the preferences of the agents.
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change a matching. We now show that when a set of agents can directly enforce a
matching µ￿λ￿ over µλ then this set can also exchange* enforce µ
￿
λ￿ over µλ.
Lemma 1. Suppose µλ →S µ￿λ￿ then µλ ￿S µ￿λ￿ .
Proof. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Exchange* enforceability allows us to define the concept of exchange* dominance:
Definition 8. A matching µλ is exchange* dominated by µ￿λ￿ by coalition S, de-
noted by µλ ￿S µ￿λ￿ , if there exists a coalition S ⊆ N of agents such that µ￿λ￿ ￿i µλ
∀i ∈ S and µλ ￿S µ￿λ￿ .
When the coalition S is a pair {i, j} (singleton {i}) then we call this an ex-
change* blocking pair (singleton). We say that {i, j} or {i} exchange* blocks
µλ. This definition allows for an exchange* blocking pair to become matched by
reshuﬄing the available location rights. In contrast to direct dominance, the ex-
istence of a coalition S ⊂ N such that µλ ￿S µ￿λ￿ does not (always) imply8 that
there also exists a set of agents {i, j} = S∗ ⊂ S, where possibly i = j, such that
µλ ￿S∗ µ∗λ∗ . We therefore have the following stability definitions based on exchange*
dominance:
Definition 9. A matching µλ is exchange* stable if it is not exchange* dominated
by any pair or individual. A matching µλ is coalition-exchange* stable if it is
not exchange* dominated by any coalition S.
Our definition of exchange* blocking is broader than the notion of exchange
blocking introduced by Alcalde (1995): a pair of agents {i, j} is said to exchange
block a matching when, only by swapping their current partners, they both improve
upon their current match. Alcalde (1995) assumes that only ’partner swaps’ can
happen and does not consider 1) that agents may decide to become single by giving
up their current matching right and 2) that there are, possibly, available match-
ing locations that agents can use to become matched by exchanging their current
8Coalition-exchange* stability implies exchange* stability but not vice versa (see for instance Manlove, 2013).
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location right for such an available location right. The concept of exchange* en-
forceability takes the latter two possibilities into account. We now illustrate these
concepts in example 1.
Example 1 continued. In the example, the matchings {(13, 24)} is exchange
stable according to Alcalde (1995). We obtain that
1. when L = {l1}, then all individually rational matchings {(12), (13), (14), (23), (24), (34)}
are exchange* stable. This set is equivalent to the set of directly stable match-
ings.
2. when L = {l1, l2}, then only matching {(13, 24)} is exchange* stable.
3. when L = {l1, l2, ..., lK} where K > 2, then no matching is exchange* stable.
The literature studied a stability notion which simultaneously requires exchange sta-
bility and Gale Shapley stability9: a matching is both (coalition-) exchange stable
and Gale Shapley stable if there is no exchange blocking pair (coalition) and no
blocking pair . Requiring both Gale Shapley stability, implicitly assuming no loca-
tion scarcity, and exchange stability, assuming location scarcity, seems a somewhat
peculiar assumption. We propose to consider the set of property rights (available
locations) as a primitive of the model and let the stability concept be based on the
enforceability rules that define how agents can transform a current matching into
another one. In particular, can matching rights be obtained through an exchange
of location rights or not? When they can (not), the concept of exchange* (direct)
enforceability is appropriate.
3.3 Direct and coalition-exchange* stability: mutually de-
pendent concepts
Example 1 is illustrative of an important conclusion we draw: when considering
the set of matching locations as a primitive of the model, coalition-exchange* sta-
bility is a refinement of direct stability. This is in contrast to the conclusion made
by Alcalde (1995) that Gale Shapley stability and exchange stability are mutually
independent concepts. We point out that Alcalde’s conclusion is based, implicitly
and explicitly, on the assumption that the sets of available matching rights are dif-
ferent when testing exchange stability and Gale Shapley stability. Once we fix the
9See Chechlarova and Manlove (2005), Irving (2008), McDermid et al. (2007), Manlove (2013).
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set of matching locations, then coalition-exchange* stability implies direct stability.
We now show formally that exchange* stability is a refinement of direct stability.
We first show the following lemma:
Lemma 2. When a matching µλ is directly blocked by a couple {i, j}, where possibly
i = j, then it is also exchange* blocked by {i, j}.
Lemma 2 can be generalized: direct dominance implies exchange* dominance.
Whenever a matching µλ is directly dominated by some matching µ￿λ￿ it follows that
µλ is also exchange* dominated by the same matching µ￿λ￿ .
Proposition 1. Given a one-to-one matching problem (N,L,P). Then µλ <S µ￿λ￿ ⇒
µλ ￿S µ￿λ￿ .
We return briefly to the relationship between (coalition-) exchange* stability and
other stability concepts. We obtain that whenever there is no scarcity in locations -
when L ≥ N − 1 - then requiring the absence of exchange* blocking pairs is equiva-
lent to simultaneously requiring the absence of exchange blocking pairs10 (exchange
stability a` la Alcalde, 1995) and the absence of blocking pairs (stability a` la Gale
Shapley, 1962).
Proposition 2. Given a one-to-one matching problem (L,N,P). When L ≥ N−1, then
(coalition-) exchange* stability is equivalent to requiring both Gale Shapley stability
and (coalition-) exchange stability.
4 Characterizing coalition-exchange* stable match-
ings
4.1 A link between exchange* dominance and indirect dominance
We can now be more precise about the matchings that are (coalition-) exchange*
stable. To do so consider the following example.
Example 2. Let (L,N, P ) where L = {l1, l2} , N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and P (1) = 3, 4, 1;P (2) =
4, 3, 2;P (3) = 2, 1, 3 and P (4) = 1, 2, 4. Given these preferences this is equivalent to
10Note that coalition-exchange* stability is a refinement of exchange* stability.
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a marriage problem and they are illustrated as follows:
agent 1 agent 2 agent 3 agent 4
3 4 2 1
4 3 1 2
1 2 3 4
Consider matchings µλ = (13, 24) and µ￿λ￿ = (14, 23), illustrated below:
       
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   µ!            µ '! '  
1 2 
43
1 2 
43
These two matchings are directly stable (and also stable in the Gale Shapley
sense). However, these matchings are not exchange* stable (nor exchange stable
in the sense of Alcalde, 1995). Indeed, agents 3 and 4 can exchange* enforce match-
ing µ￿λ￿ over matching µλ and agents 1 and 2 can exchange* enforce matching µλ
over matching µ￿λ￿ .
By close inspection we observe that while agents 1 and 2 cannot directly enforce
matching µλ over matching µ￿λ￿, they may do so in two steps, assuming that both
agents are forward looking. In a first step they could simply divorce in order to,
in a second step, match with each other’s ex-partners. Hence, if agents 1 and 2
cannot exchange their matching location rights, they may still be able to ’swap’
their partners if they are not myopic. We generalize this intuition by showing that
there is a close relationship between exchange* dominance and indirect dominance,
a farsighted dominance concept introduced by Harsanyi (1974) and Chwe (1994) to
study what happens when agents do not care about the immediate consequences of
their actions but rather to the final outcome after other agents have reacted to their
initial reaction. A matching µ￿λ￿ indirectly dominates µλ if µ
￿
λ￿ can replace µλ in a
sequence of matchings, such that at each matching along the sequence all deviators
are strictly better oﬀ at the end matching µ￿λ￿ compared to the status-quo. Formally,
indirect dominance is defined as follows in our setting
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Definition 10. Amatching µλ is indirectly dominated by µ￿λ￿ , denoted by µλ ￿ µ￿λ￿ ,
if there exists a sequence of matchings µ0λ0 , µ
1
λ1 , ..., µ
K
λK (where µ
0
λ0 = µλ and µ
K
λK =
µ￿λ￿) and a sequence of coalitions S
0, S1, ..., SK−1 such that for any k ∈ {1, ..., K},
1. µKλK ￿i µk−1λk−1 ∀i ∈ Sk−1; and
2. coalition Sk−1 can enforce the matching µkλkover µ
K
λK ￿i µk−1λk−1 .
Direct dominance can be obtained from definition 9 by setting K = 1. Obviously,
if µλ < µ￿λ￿ then µλ ￿ µ￿λ￿ ; i.e., direct dominance implies indirect dominance. The
set of matchings that are not indirectly dominated by any other matching is the
farsighted core:
Definition 11. Given is matching problem (L,N, P ). A matching µλ belongs to the
farsighted core (FC) if no other matching µ￿λ￿ indirectly dominates µλ.
When the set of locations is scarce, the farsighted core, if it exists, is not nec-
essarily a singleton (see example 4). Indirect dominance oﬀers the possibility to
two agents to contemplate ’exchanging’ their partners, as long as the latter would
prefer to remain matched compared to being single. Exchange* dominance allows
these two agents to do so directly, even if their partners would prefer to be single
rather than being rematched through a swap they did not initiate. We now confirm
this intuition in Theorem 1: whenever an individually rational matching exchange*
dominates some other matching then it also indirectly dominates this matching.
Theorem 1. Let (L,N, P ) be a one-to-one matching problem with matching location
restrictions. Let µ￿λ￿ , µλ ∈M∗, if µ￿λ￿ ￿ µλ and if for all i such that µ￿λ￿(i) ￿= µλ(i)
it is that case that µ￿λ￿(i) ￿i i then µ￿λ￿ ￿ µλ.
Theorem 1 implies that for individually rational matching problems the farsighted
core must belong to the set of coalition-exchange* stable matchings. Example 3.
shows that this result does not carry through to the case of matchings problems
which are not individually rational: when µ￿λ￿ ￿ µλ and µ￿λ￿ is not individually
rational, then it is not necessarily the case that µ￿λ￿ ￿ µλ.
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Example 3. Consider the following marriage problem (L,M,W, P ) whereM = {m1,m2}
and W = {w1, w2} and L = {l1, l2} with the following preferences:
m1 m2 w1 w2
w2 w1 m1 m2
w1 w2 w1 w2
m1 m2 m2 m1
Let µ￿λ￿ = (m1w2,m2w1) and let µλ = (m1w1,m2w2), as illustrated below:
We then have that µ￿λ￿ ￿ µλ but not that µ￿λ￿ ￿ µλ. Indeed, the women would
never accept to remarry a diﬀerent man than their partner in µλ. That is, exchange*
enforceability can transform an individually rational match into an individually ra-
tional match. This possibility is ruled out by indirect dominance. Note that in this
example the farsighted core is a singleton: FC = {µλ} while the set of coalition-
exchange* stable matchings is empty.
While Theorem 1 implies that for individually rational matching problems ex-
change* dominance entail indirect dominance, the converse is not the case: indirect
dominance does not imply exchange* dominance. This is illustrated by example 4:
Example 4. Consider the following marriage problem (M,W,L, P ) whereM = {m1,m2}
and W = {w1, w2} and L = {l1, l2} with the following preferences:
m1 m2 w1 w2
w2 w2 m1 m1
w1 w1 m2 m2
m1 m2 w1 w2
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Let µ￿λ￿ = (m1w2,m2w1) and let µλ = (m1w1,m2w2). We then have that µ
￿
λ￿ ￿ µλ
but also that µ￿λ￿ ￿ µλ since m1 and w2 cannot obtain the rights to a matching
location at which they can match. In this example the farsighted core is a singleton:
FC = {µλ} while the set of exchange* stable matchings is a couple: {µ￿λ￿ , µλ}.
Example 4 clarifies that for individually rational matching problems the far-
sighted core can be a strict subset of the set of exchange* stable matchings. We now
show that this result depends on the level of location scarcity.
Definition 12. Given is matching problem (L,N, P ). A matching µλ belongs to the
set of exchange* stable matchings (E*) if a pair (or individual) of agents can
enforce a matching that exchange* dominates µλ. A matching µλ belongs to the
set of coalition-exchange* stable matchings (C-E*) if no other matching µ￿λ￿
exchange* dominates µλ.
When there is no scarcity (L ≥ N −1), then the set of coalition-exchange* stable
matchings is equivalent to the farsighted core, while not necessarily equal to the set
of exchange* stable matchings. We have the following corollary:
Corollary 1. The farsighted core of any individually rational matching problem be-
longs to the set of exchange* stable matchings: if FC ⊂ E∗. However, E∗ ￿ FC.
When L ≥ N − 1, we have that FC = C-E∗￿ E∗.
4.2 Stable sets
Often times the farsighted core is empty which lead people to introduce alterna-
tive stability concepts to study farsightedly stable matchings. A popular stability
concept is that of the farsighted stable set (FSS)11. A farsighted stable set of
a matching problem is a set of matchings that satisfies internal stability - no
matching of the set indirectly dominates another matching of the set - and ex-
ternal stability - all matchings outside the set are indirectly dominated by some
matching(s) belonging to the set.
Definition 13. A set of matchings V ⊆ M∗ is a von Neumann Morgenstern
farsighted stable set (FSS) if
11See Ray and Vohra (2014) for a recent analysis of the concept of farsighted stable set in coalition formation
problems.
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(i) for all µλ ∈ V , there does not exist µ￿λ￿ ∈ V such that µ￿λ￿ ￿ µλ (internal
stability);
(ii) for all µ￿λ￿ /∈ V there exists µλ ∈ V such that µλ ￿ µ￿λ￿ (external stability).
In general, existence of a such a set is not guaranteed, nor its uniqueness when it
exists. In the case of no scarcity, Mauleon et al. (2011) and Klaus et al. (2011)
have shown that if a matching is GS stable (and thus directly stable in our setting),
then it is a singleton FSS. When a matching is not stable, a FSS may not exist, as
illustrated by our example 1 or may have more than two elements (see example 2 in
Klaus et al. (2011).
Example 1 continued. Let (L,N, P ) where , L = {l1, l2, ..., lk} where k >
2, N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and P (1) = 3, 4, 1;P (2) = 4, 3, 2;P (3) = 2, 1, 3 and P (4) =
1, 2, 4. Given these preferences this is equivalent to a marriage problem and they are
illustrated as follows:
agent 1 agent 2 agent 3 agent 4
2 3 1 1
3 1 2 2
4 4 4 3
It is easily verified that no FSS exists.
We define an exchange* stable set (ESS) as a set of matchings such that
they do not exchange* dominate each other while any matching outside the set is
exchange* dominated by some matching in the set.
Definition 14. A set of matchings E ⊆M∗ is an exchange* stable set (ESS) if
(i) for all µλ ∈ E, there does not exist µ￿λ￿ ∈ E such that µ￿λ￿ ￿ µλ;
(ii) for all µ￿λ￿ /∈ E there exists µλ ∈ E such that µλ ￿ µ￿λ￿ .
In the case when L ≥ N −1, Klaus et al. (2011) have shown that (lemma 1 in Klaus
et al., 2011) any matching belonging to a FSS must be individually rational. Their
result immediately extends to our setting with location restrictions.
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Lemma 3. Given is a matching problem (L,N, P ). Let V be a FSS, then any µλ ∈ V
is individually rational.
We now show (proposition 3) that an ESS cannot be a strict subset of a FSS while
the opposite can hold. The latter conclusion is demonstrated by example 4.
Proposition 3. Given is a matching problem (L,N, P ). Let V be a FSS and consider
V ￿ ￿ V , then V’ cannot be a ESS.
Example 4 continued. Consider the following marriage problem (L,M,W, P )
where M = {m1,m2} and W = {w1, w2} and L = {l1, ..., lk} where k > 0 with the
following preferences:
m1 m2 w1 w2
w2 w2 m1 m1
w1 w1 m2 m2
m1 m2 w1 w2
For all sets of location restrictions there is a unique FSS, and a unique ESS. For
all k > 1 the FSS is a strict subset of the ESS.
1. When L = {l1} we have that FSS = ESS = {(m1w1) , (m1w2) , (m2w1) , (m2w2)}
2. When L = {l1, ..., lk} we k > 1 have that FSS ￿ ESS. We have that FSS =
{(m1w2,m2w1)}￿ {(m1w2,m2w1) , (m1w1,m2w2)} =ESS.
We end our discussion of the exchange* stable set by providing an example which
has no FSS but there exists a ESS.
Example 1 continued. This matching problem does not have a FSS. Now
consider the following matchings: µ1λ1 = (13, 24), µ
2
λ2 = (12, 34), and µ
3
λ3 = (14, 23),
in which agents are matched at locations l1 and l2 (all other locations are available),
and let the set E be the set of all location permutations of these matchings (matched
at li and lj). There are
￿
k
2
￿
matchings in E and E satisfies internal stability:
no matching of E exchange* dominates another matching of this set. All other
matchings are exchange* dominated by a matching of E (external stability). Hence,
set E is an exchange* stable set.
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5 Computational complexity
In computer science the algorithmic aspects of matching problems have been
studied at length. A large body of literature (see Gusfield and Irving, 1989 and
Manlove, 2013) emerged studying whether deciding if a given roommate problem
admits a (Gale Shapley) stable matching is a computationally complex question. A
smaller literature12 asked the same question while replacing Gale Shapley stability
with the concept of exchange stability introduced by Alcalde (1995). In addition,
Irving (2008) finds that deciding whether a roommate problem admits a matching
which is simultaneously Gale Shapley stable and exchange stable a` la Alcalde (1995)
is computationally hard:
Theorem 2. (Irving, 2008) “The problem of deciding whether a given stable roommate
instance admits a stable matching that is exchange stable is NP-complete.”
Our proposition 2 shows that, when L ≥ N − 1, coalition-exchange* stability is
equivalent to simultaneously requiring Gale Shapley stability and coalition-exchange
stability and corollary 1 shows that the set of coalition-exchange* stable matchings
is equivalent to the farsighted core for an individually rational matching problem.
We conclude that finding a farsightedly stable matching in an individually rational
one-to-one matching problem without location scarcity is also computationally hard:
Corollary 2. Let L ≥ N − 1. Deciding whether an individually rational roommate
problem admits a farsightedly stable matching is NP complete
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature on the roommate and marriage problem
in several dimensions. First , this paper explicitly introduces matching location
restrictions in the one-to-one matching problem. When the set of matching locations
is large (no scarcity), the matching problem is equivalent to the classic matching
problem. When scarcity of matching locations exists some agents may want to
form a new partnership without being able to implement it. Second, it develops
the concepts of direct and coalition-exchange* stability in the general setting and
12Cechlarova (2002), Cechlarova and Manlove (2005), Irving (2008), McDermid et al. (2007).
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shows that coalition-exchange* stability is a refinement of direct stability. In the
absence of location scarcity, direct stability is equivalent to Gale Shapley stability
and exchange* stability is equivalent to simultaneously requiring exchange stability
a` la Alcalde (1995) and Gale Shapley stability. Third , the paper shows that there
exists a natural relationship between indirect dominance and exchange* dominance
allowing to conclude that set of coalition-exchange* stable matchings is a superset
of the farsighted core, and equal to the farsighted core if locations are not scarce and
the matching problem is individually rational. It is shown that an exchange* stable
set can not be a strict subset of a farsighted stable set. In addition, an example is
provided of a roommate problem in which no farsighted stable set exists while an
exchange* stable set does exist. Fourth, by using well known complexity results, the
paper obtains that deciding whether the farsighted core of an individually rational
roommate problem exists is NP-complete.
Many questions remain unanswered. We have not fully characterized exchange*
stable matchings. We have not tackled the question whether an exchange* stable set
always exists. While we have shown that deciding whether the (unique) farsighted
core of a individually rational roommate problem exists is computationally hard,
we have not done so for individually irrational roommate problems. Nor have we
discussed how to extend our setting to many-to-one or many-to-many matching
problems. We leave these questions for future research.
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Appendix
Lemma 1. Suppose µλ →S µ￿λ￿ then µλ ￿S µ￿λ￿ .
Proof. Note that µλ →S µ￿λ￿ implies that for all i such that λ￿(i) ￿= λ(i)⇒ i ∈ S and
λ￿(i) ∈ Lλ(S). Since Lλ(S) ⊆ Lλ(S), let all these agents i belong to S ￿. But then,
by the definition of exchange enforceability: µλ ￿S￿ µ￿λ￿ where we note that S ￿ = S.
Lemma 2. When a matching µλ is directly blocked by a couple {i, j}, where
possibly i = j, then it is also exchange* blocked by {i, j}.
Proof. First assume that i = j. Hence for agent i we have that i ￿ µλ(i). Then agent
i can simply ’divorce’ from µλ(i) without being assigned a new location. But the
same move can be done through an exchange* blocking singleton: i just gives up
her location assignment. Second assume that i ￿= j and µ￿λ￿(i) = j. Then it must be
that λ￿(i) = λ￿(j) = l￿ where l￿ ∈ Lλ({i, j}). In other words, location λ−1(l￿) = ∅ : it
was not assigned to anyone in λ. But then {i, j} can exchange* enforce µ￿λ￿ over µλ,
by exchanging their current location for l￿.
Proposition 1. Given a one-to-one matching problem (L,N, P ). Then µλ <S
µ￿λ￿ ⇒ µλ ￿S µ￿λ￿ .
Proof. This proposition follows immediately from lemma 1.
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Proposition 2. Given a one-to-one matching problem (L,N, P ). When L ≥
N − 1, then (coalition-) exchange* stability is equivalent to requiring both Gale
Shapley stability and (coalition-) exchange stability.
Proof. The proof is done for exchange* stability and exchange stability. Proving that
it also holds for coalition-exchange* stability and coalition exchange stability follows
the exact same lines and is therefore omitted.
⇒ Suppose that µλ is exchange* stable and there exists either a blocking pair
(individual) or exchange blocking pair. Suppose first that {i, j} is a blocking pair
(or individual when i = j ) of µλ. Since L ≥ N − 1 {i, j} can enforce the matching
µ￿λ￿ where µ
￿
λ￿ = µλ − iµλ(i) − jµλ(j) + ij . We then have that µ￿λ￿ ￿{i,j} µλ, a
contradiction. Now suppose that {i, j} is a exchange blocking pair. But then for
any L we have that µ￿λ￿ ￿{i,j} µλ, again a contradiction.
⇐ Suppose there does not exist a blocking pair, nor an exchange blocking pair
but their exists a pair {i, j} (or individual when i = j ) and a matching µ￿λ￿ such that
µ￿λ￿ ￿{i,j} µλ. Since {i, j} is not an exchange blocking pair or individual(s), then it
must be that they must be matched or alone in µ￿λ￿ in which they are better oﬀ. But
then {i, j} would be a blocking pair, a contradiction.
Theorem 1. Let (L,N, P ) be a one-to-one matching problem with matching
location restrictions. Let µ￿λ￿ , µλ ∈ M∗, if µ￿λ￿ ￿ µλ and if for all i such that
µ￿λ￿(i) ￿= µλ(i) it is that case that µ￿λ￿(i) ￿i i then µ￿λ￿ ￿ µλ.
Proof. Let B(µλ, µ￿λ￿) be the set of agents who are better oﬀ in µ
￿
λ￿ compared to µλ:
B(µλ, µ￿λ￿) = {i ∈ N, µλ(i) ≺i µλ￿(i)}. Let I(µλ) be the set of agents who are single
in µλ: I(µλ) = {i ∈ N, µλ(i) = i}. We have that there exists a set of agents S who
can exchange* enforce µ￿λ￿ over µλ and be better oﬀ in µ
￿
λ￿ . We now construct an
indirect dominance path from µλ to µ￿λ￿ . Let µ
1
λ1 be a matching where all agents of
S are single, if necessary by leaving their partner in µλ by giving up their location
assignment under λ. Let S1 ⊆ S be those agents belonging to S who have a partner
in µλ: S1 = S \ I(µλ). We then have that µλ →S1µ1λ1 and for all i ∈ S1 : µ￿λ￿ ￿i µ.
Now consider the set S2 = B(µ1λ1 , µ
￿
λ￿). For any i ∈ S2 we have
1. µ￿λ￿(i) ￿= i and µ￿λ￿(i) = j ∈ S. Then it must be that λ￿(i) = λ￿(j) = l￿ ∈
Lλ({i, j}). But then λ−1(l￿) = {i, j} and hence l￿ ∈ Lλ1({i, j}); or
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2. µ￿λ￿(i) ￿= i and µ￿λ￿(i) = j /∈ S. Then it must be that λ(j) = λ￿(j) = l and
l ∈Lλ(S). But then λ−1(l￿) = {i, j} and hence l￿ ∈ Lλ1({i, j}); or
3. µ￿λ￿(i) = i. But then i /∈ S2.
We then have that for all i ∈ S2 : λ￿(i) ∈ Lλ1(S2) and hence we have that µ1λ1
→S2µ￿λ￿ . We conclude that µ￿λ￿ ￿µλ.
Corollary 1. Given is an individually rational one-to-one matching problem
(L,N, P ). We have
1. FC ⊂ E∗. However, E∗ ￿ FC.
2. When L ≥ N − 1, we have that FC = C − E∗￿ E∗.
Proof. Given is that (L,N, P ) is individually rational.
1. Suppose first that µλ ∈ FC and µλ /∈ E∗. Then there exists µ￿λ￿ and {i, j}
where possibly i = j such that µ￿λ￿ ￿{ij} µλ. Since µ￿λ￿ is individually rational, it
follows from Theorem 1 that µ￿λ￿ ￿ µλ, a contradiction. That E∗ ￿ FC follows
from example 4.
2. Now let L ≥N−1, and let µλ ∈ C−E∗. Suppose that there exists µ￿λ￿ such that
µ￿λ￿ ￿ µλ. Consider the set B(µλ, µ￿λ￿), then µ￿λ￿ ￿B(µλ,µ￿λ￿ ) µλ. However, since
L ≥ N − 1, there are always enough matching locations to let the members of
B(µλ, µ￿λ￿) enforce any partner swap and/or any direct blocking coalition since
there are at least 12￿B(µλ, µ
￿
λ￿) locations available for members of B(µλ, µ
￿
λ￿) who
want to be matched to each other. Hence it must be that µ￿λ￿ ￿B(µλ,µ￿λ￿ ) µλ, a
contradiction. Exmaple 4 has illustrated that FC = C − E∗￿ E∗ even if L ≥
N − 1.
Lemma 3. Given a one-to-one matching problem (L,N, P ). Let V be a FSS, then
any µλ ∈ V is individually rational.
Proof. The proof is equivalent to the proof of lemma 1 in Klaus et al. (2011) and
therefore omitted.
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Proposition 3. Given a one-to-one matching problem (L,N, P ). Let V be a FSS
and consider V ￿ ￿ V , then V ￿ cannot be a ESS.
Proof. Let V ￿ ⊂ V where V is a FSS. Let µλ ∈ V while µλ /∈ V ￿. Then it must be that
there exists µ￿λ￿ ∈ V ￿ such that µ￿λ￿ ￿ µλ, but since µ￿λ￿ is individually rational (using
Lemma 3) we know (using Theorem 1) that µ￿λ￿ ￿ µλ, violating internal stability of
V , hence V is not a FSS, a contradiction.
Corollary 2. Deciding whether an individually rational roommate problem admits
a farsightedly stable matching is NP complete.
Proof. This follows immediately from Proposition 2, Corollary 1 above and Theorem
2 in Irving (2008).
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